Abstract. Historians can use the concept of causation in a variety of ways, each of which is associated with different historiographical claims and different kinds of argumentation. The author shows that, contrary to the usual view, historical narratives are causal (in a specific way), and microhistory can be seen as a response to a very specific causal problem of Braudelian macrohistory.
n an article in Rethinking History, Frank Ankersmit (2005) complained that many debates in the philosophy of history are obscured by the fact that contemporary philosophers of history have, generally speaking, no real command of the technical details of central concepts in contemporary philosophy of science and philosophy of language. This is not only true for philosophers of history but also (even a fortiori) for practicing historians. Although we cannot reasonably expect practicing historians to become philosophers of science and language, many concepts, theories, and insights could benefit historians in their research just as well as they do philosophers of history. I believe that is particularly the case with respect to the concept of causation.
It is often taken for granted (and certainly not only by historians) that causation is an unambiguous concept that can be easily defined or intuitively grasped. I believe that this is a mistake. For a long time, many metaphysicians and philosophers of science have struggled to find a clear and univocal definition or description of causation, but no one has succeeded. It might even be fair to say that none of them has even come close. Thus, philosophers have in recent years developed a new approach, namely causal pluralism. (See Hall 2004; Cartwright 2007; De Vreese 2006; Hitchcock 2003.) Causal pluralists argue that causation as a concept cannot be univocally defined. According to causal pluralism, the monistic theories that have been developed over the years all stress different aspects of causation, but none of them can fully capture the concept. The research problem of causal pluralism consists of determining which aspects of causation are caught by which theory and which of these aspects are used in which context. In this article, I aim to do so with respect to historiography. I suggest that different kinds of causation are used in different kinds of historical research, and, more important, that historians also use different concepts with regard to one single historical question. By identifying these different types of causation, I hope to shed new light on some aspects in the philosophy of history, such as the distinctions between the use of narratives and causal statements and between microhistory and macrohistory.
Theories of Causation

Counterfactual and Regularity Theories of Causation
Hume's legacy. Counterfactual and regularity theories characterize causation in terms of properties of cause and effect, rather than the process or relation that links them. What takes place between a cause and its effect is regarded as a black box. In this sense, one might say that these theories are actually more about cause and effect than causation as such. The starting point of any such theory is David Hume, who defined causes in the following ways:
We may define a CAUSE to be "an object precedent and contiguous to another, and where all the objects resembling the former are plac'd in like relations of precedency and contiguity to those objects that resemble the latter." (Hume 2006a, 114) Suitably to this experience, therefore, we may define a cause to be an object, followed by another, and where all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second. Or in other words where, if the first object had not been, the second never had existed. (Hume 2006b, 60) Actually, the second quote consists of two different definitions. In the first quote and the first part of the second quote, Hume defined causation as constant conjunction (every A is followed by B) combined with temporal priority and (in the first quote, but not in the second) contiguity. Therefore, a cause of a certain phenomenon is a cause because it is always followed by its effect. 1 In the second part of the second quote, he defined causation as counterfactual dependence: A is said to cause B if and only if the following statement is true: "if A had not occurred, B would not have occurred either."
These two definitions have led to two different philosophical traditions. On the one hand, some philosophers have focused on the constant conjunction. It became clear almost immediately that demanding a constant conjunction in a literal sense would be too strict. For example, if the rain is the cause of the fact that I am wet, it does not imply that I get wet every single time it rains (I might use an umbrella or stay inside). The alternative solution seems to be to regard causation as probability raising: despite the fact that I might not get wet every time it rains, I am much more likely to get wet when it does. More specifically, there are many more situations in which I get wet when it rains than those in which I get wet when it doesn't rain. Rain can therefore be regarded as a probability raiser for getting wet and, provided there are no common causes for both the rain and my getting wet, also as a cause. For classical formulations of these definitions, see Patrick Suppes (1970) and Judea Pearl (2000) .
On the other hand, some philosophers have elaborated on Hume's counterfactual statement, the most influential being David Lewis (1983-86) . Contrary to the tradition based on Hume's first definition, the second one can still be grasped more or less in its essence by referring to Hume's definition, thus explaining my reason for not developing this point any further.
Multiple causes.
A problem central to the philosophy of causation, and probably the most important one for historiography, is that of multiple causes, first presented as a theme by John Stuart Mill (1973, 327) .
It is seldom, if ever, between a consequent and a single antecedent, that this invariable sequence subsists. It is usually between a consequent and the sum of several antecedents; the occurrence of all of them being requisite to produce, that is, to be certain of being followed by, the consequent.
Despite the fact that we normally select one specific antecedent as the cause, Mill insisted that we should call the complete set of antecedents the cause:
In such cases it is very common to single out only one of the antecedents under the denomination of Cause, calling the others merely Conditions. (ibid.)
The real Cause, is the whole of these antecedents; and we have philosophically speaking, no right to give the name of cause to one of them, exclusively of the others. (ibid., 328) In Mill's view, singling out one of the antecedents as the cause (and thus distinguishing the cause from mere conditions) may be useful in everyday life, but it should not be done in philosophy or in scientific investigation.
2 Suppose that a forest is hit by a lightning flash that causes a forest fire. From a scientific point of view, the lightning flash is not in itself the cause of the fire but is a part of a complex condition, which might also include the fact that the grass was very dry and that there was no fire truck in the vicinity.
I have referred to this point as the problem of multiple causation, because, despite Mill, it is indeed experienced as a problem in science as well as in common language. Although scientific research is, in general, more open to multiple causes (or a single cause consisting of multiple parts) than common language, it is limited. Following my example of the fire, we could indeed consider both the lightning flash and the dryness of the grass as additional causes. But do we also have to consider the presence of oxygen on earth (a precondition for trees to grow) or the Big Bang itself as causes or parts of a cause? In a philosophical discourse, this line of reasoning might be defensible, but in scientific research, it seems absurd. It may be the case that, even if we do consider multiple causation, we still make some kind of selection on the basis of what is relevant for a given situation. Although this selection might be less arbitrary and more encompassing in scientific research than in common language, the need for such a selection still exists.
Herbert Hart and Tony Honoré (1985, 33) were the first to develop an explicit criterion for a selection of this kind. They stated, more or less, that our identification of causes depends on contextual factors in the sense that only phenomena considered to be at odds with the normal course of events can be considered to be causes. According to Hart and Honoré, the condition we select as cause is regarded as such because it stands out with respect to a certain "default status of the world." Most of this default status is common to most people within a certain context. The fact that there was a Big Bang is presupposed in almost all cases, with the exception of some causal statements in astrophysics. Nevertheless, some factors of this default status of the world can vary significantly in different circumstances. Hart and Honoré provided two illustrative examples.
In most cases where a fire has broken out, the lawyer, the historian and the plain man would refuse to say that the cause of the fire was the presence of oxygen, though no fire would have occurred without it: they would reserve the title of cause for something of the order of a short-circuit, the dropping of a lighted cigarette, or lightning. Yet there are contexts where it would be natural to say that the presence of the oxygen was the cause of the fire. We have only to consider a factory where delicate manufacturing processes are carried on, requiring the exclusion of oxygen, to make it perfectly sensible to identify as the cause of a fire the presence of oxygen introduced by someone's mistake. (ibid., 11)
The cause of a great famine in India may be identified by the Indian peasant as the drought, but the World Food Authority may identify the Indian government's failure to build up reserves as the cause and the drought as a mere condition. (Hart and Honoré 1985, 35; 1966, 219) Depending on whether one is an Indian farmer or a member of the World Food Authority, the cause of the famine is different. Either we regard the drought as normal, which makes the failure to stockpile food the cause, or we consider the failure to stockpile food as normal, in which case the drought is the cause (see also Menzies 2007, 209-11) . This does not mean that one is correct and the other incorrect. Both statements are right with respect to the perspective of the one who states it, so causal statements are not nonobjective or arbitrary in any way, because the perspective itself, or the situation out of which it arises, is perfectly describable in an objective way.
3 Hart and Honoré (1966, 1985) regard this process of selection as a negative procedure: only what is not regarded as normal can be selected as a cause. Recently some philosophers have formulated it in a positive way, stating that the conditions we select out of a background are typically those we are (or could be) able to change or manipulate (see especially Woodward 2003) . 4 According to this approach, the value of a variable A causes the value of variable B if an intervention on the value of A would also entail (or would have entailed) a change in the value of B. For example, heat causes a thermometer to rise because if we lowered the heat, the thermometer would drop as well. By contrast, if we raise the mercury level in the thermometer, the environment does not get any warmer or colder. It is not important whether these interventions are practically possible. Causal interventionists and manipulationists typically define causation in terms of possible interventions. They state that we speak of relations as causal only when we imagine that we could intervene or could have intervened (as is the case in historiography).
Defining causation is one thing, but offering methods for finding causes and effects in specific cases is something else. The basic methods for identifying causes according to the theories previously mentioned have been formulated by Mill in his two canons of induction. It is important to note that, according to Mill, only the second one (the Method of Difference) is capable of providing reliable knowledge on causes and effects.
If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all the instances agree, is the cause (or effect) of the given phenomenon. (Mill 1973, 390) If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in common save one, that one occurring only in the former; the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ, is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon. (ibid., 391)
Mill's method of difference forms the starting point of the modern experimental methods that are used to discover causes in most social sciences as well as considerable areas within the medical sciences (see Horsten and Weber 2005 for examples).
Process Theories and Mechanisms
The second kind of theory tries to describe causation not by referring to properties of cause and effect but by focusing on the process of causation itself, which runs from an effect to a cause. Of these, the two most important are the process theories by Wesley Salmon (1984 Salmon ( , 1994 and Phil Dowe (2000) , and the theories about mechanisms by Stuart Glennan (1996) and Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden, and Carl Craver (2000) .
Causal processes. The general idea of a theory of causation as a process has been around in the philosophy of science for quite a while, in accounts of, among others, Bertrand Russell (1953) , Hans Reichenbach (1958 ), Brian Skyrms (1980 , Jerrold Aronson (1971) , and David Fair (1979) , but it became especially influential through Wesley Salmon's (1984) formulation. The basic concept of Salmon's theory is the notion of a causal process. The concept of a causal process can be intuitively grasped as the movement of a persistent object through time and space, 5 such as a rolling billiard ball or a space station flying in orbit around the earth. This process is considered causal because the fact that the flying space station is at a certain point at a certain time is due to the fact that it was at a slightly different point at a slightly earlier time. Again, this fact is caused by the fact that it was at a slightly different point at a slightly earlier time, and so on. This is so again and again for every point of time and space in the trajectory of the space station. The concept of causation is therefore present throughout the whole process, thus explaining the reason it is called a causal process.
6 It is not possible to single out specific causes and effects, because there are only an infinite number of positions in time and space that cause, and are caused by, each other. Therefore, a causal process cannot be described by a limited number of specific causal statements styled as "A causes B."
Apart from causal processes in and of themselves, Salmon (1984) also discussed interactions between causal processes. The idea of a causal interaction is based on the root metaphor of two colliding objects such as billiard balls. Basically, a causal interaction occurs when two causal processes intersect (e.g., when two billiard balls collide), resulting in a change in the properties of both causal processes-for example, speed and direction. 7 A collision between two billiard balls is a causal interaction, because the speed and direction of both balls are significantly altered after the collision. An intersection of two spots that are projected on a wall by spotlights is not a causal interaction, because the spots can move through each other without their speed, direction, or any other important characteristic being altered. Although Salmon's and Dowe's theories were originally developed to explain theories of causation in the physical world (the world as described by physics), it has been suggested that, if they were interpreted in somewhat more functional and analogical terms, their theories can give us important insights into the social sciences as well (Weber 2002 ). We will see that this is very much the case for historiography.
Mechanisms.
A more recent attempt to define the process of causation itself appears in the different theories about mechanisms, the most important of which are those of Glennan (1996) and Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000) . An intuitive approach considers a mechanism to be a chain of events that runs from a cause to an effect. A cause is a cause and an effect is an effect because they are linked by a mechanism. The events forming the parts of the chain are generally thought to consist of certain types of entities (e.g., individuals, organs, molecules) that influence each other. For example, the fact that I toggle a light switch causes the light to go on, because by pushing the light switch, I remove a barrier for an electric current, which ends up in a thin filament inside a light bulb, which consequently heats up and produces light. Therefore, one can say that there is a mechanism that runs from the cause (my toggling a light switch) to the effect (the light bulb's lighting up). A second example is taken from Dan Steel (2004, 59 ), who in turn adopted it from Bronislaw Malinowski (1935) .
For example, consider the anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski's (1935) account of how having more wives was a cause of increased wealth among Trobriand chiefs. Among the Trobrianders, men were required to make substantial annual contributions of yams to the households of their married sisters. Hence, the more wives a man had, the more yams he would receive. Yams, meanwhile, were the primary form of wealth in Trobriand society and served to finance such chiefly endeavors as canoe building and warfare. Although individuals play a prominent role in this account, they do so as representatives of social categories: brothers-in-law, wives, and chiefs.
Mechanisms come in two slightly different kinds that can be labeled complex-system mechanisms and mediating mechanisms (Weber and Leuridan 2008) . 8 The difference between complex-system mechanisms and mediating mechanisms can best be explained in terms of levels. In a complexsystem mechanism, cause and effect are situated at different levels (a level can be understood as a specific terrain within a scientific discipline of which a more or less self-contained coherent description is possible and which employs a series of specific concepts that do not occur outside of this terrain) between the individual and the population level, or they are at the same level, but the mechanism that links them "runs" at a different level. Complex-system mechanisms are especially present in biology, which often explains the behavior of a certain organ by referring to its parts as the cause of this behavior (see Glennan 1996; Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000) . Steel's (2004) example is a complexsystem mechanism, because the relation between cause and effect-the number of wives a man has and his wealth, respectively-is set at the aggregate (or population) level. The mechanism, however, is given in terms of the (determinate) behavior of individuals. In a mediating mechanism, however, cause and effect are located at the same level and are connected by a mechanism that "runs" at this very same level. A mechanism in this sense can run from an action by one individual to another individual, or from one variable to another (see Pearl 2000; Morgan and Winship 2007) . 9 
Preliminaries in Applying Concepts of Causation
As I previously stated, I will use these theories in a pluralistic way, as I am convinced that none of them presents a complete account or theory of what causation is in itself or how it should be understood. However, all of them point at specific methods one can use to find cause and effect and to interpret causal relationships. I will now show that this approach also applies to historiography. Historians use different definitions of causation in different kinds of research and, more important, different definitions of causation within the same historical study. If we apply these criteria, we see that (1) contrary to what is often stated, the macrohistory of the second generation of the Annales-a group of scholars who were dominant during the early years after World War II, led by French historian Fernand Braudel, that stressed the importance of quantitative methods and largescale research to make history a more "scientific" scienceis (partly) narrative instead of causal and (2) microhistory appears to be essentially causal instead of narrative.
Causation in Historiography
What, How, and Why
Historiography consists of giving answers to three different types of questions: What? How? Why? (Stanford 1998, 128-29; Stone 1979, 5) . The first type of question is concerned with what we make of past events-whether a certain predicate is applicable to a certain historical event, person, or situation. Historians have wondered, for example, whether or not the French Revolution was a radical break with the ancien régime, or whether the French writer François Rabelais could or could not be considered to have been an atheist. This type of inquiry, however, does not (at least not directly) involve any kind of causal statements, so I will not treat it any further here.
The two other types of inquiries-How? Why?-do require causal statements as their answers. I say causal, because there is an essential difference in the ways in which causation and causal statements are used to answer both kinds of questions. The answer to why is typically a causal statement. If one asks "Why did something happen?" or "Why does a certain event, situation, or person have a specific property?" we expect the answer to begin with "because." It is possible in principle to summarize any historiographical work that presents such an argument in one sentence with the form: "A was caused by B." Henri Pirenne's (2001) Mohammed and Charlemagne, for example, can (disrespectfully) be summarized into the statement: "The rise of (the specific nature of) Medieval Europe as we know it was caused by the closing off of the Mediterranean by the Arab world." We cannot give such a one-sentence summary of historical narratives, which form answers to historiographical questions of how, such as, "How did the French Revolution develop?" or "How did the price of wheat in the ancien régime change over time?" Nevertheless, the concept of causation also plays a part in the construction of narratives.
What Are Historical Narratives?
A narrative is sometimes mistaken for a simple description of a series of events. Despite the fact that every narrative is certainly descriptive, it is also something more. A narrative describes its facts in a coherent way, with a certain direction and meaning. Morton White (1965) has given the following example: The sentence "The King of England died, which led the Queen to grieve, which led the princess to worry" could be an example of a historical narrative, whereas "The King of England died, and then the queen grieved, after which the princess began to worry" could not (Dray 1971, 162) . In the second sentence, the events are simply put alongside each other, whereas in the first one, there is a causal relation between the different events through which they are combined to form a coherent whole.
To be a narrative, a text should also have a clear and meaningful ending and beginning. If not, it is not a narrative, but what Hayden White (1987, 16-19) and Michael Stanford (1998, 219 ) called a chronicle. One of the main arguments for the difference is that the ending of a narrative can have a definite influence on the characterization of every part of it. White gives the following example:
The king went to Westminster on June 3, 1321. There the fateful meeting occurred between the king and the man who was ultimately to challenge him for his throne, though at the time the two men appeared to be destined to become the best of friends. (White 1973, 5) So a historical narrative is not just a coherent (causal) ordering of a number of events. The narrative itself, as a whole, also influences the nature of its parts.
Next to these two features (causal coherence and a definite beginning and ending), a narrative should have two other properties, which are strongly related to one another. First, every narrative should have a plot (e.g., tragedy, comedy, satire), which White (1973, 9) defines as "a structure of relationships by which the events contained in the account are endowed with a meaning by being identified as parts of an integrated whole." Because it has a plot, the narrative constitutes a story, and because every story is a story about something, a narrative should also have a central subject (Dray 1971, 157) . Such a subject does not necessarily have to be physically stable over time. Leopold von Ranke's (1840) History of the Popes is a narrative about a purely institutional and conceptual entity ("the pope"), not about a physical thing. Augustin Thierry's (1835) essay "Histoire Véritable de Jacques Bonhomme" has as its central subject an archetype of the French farmer, whose experiences cover many centuries, and who leads a purely conceptual existence (Ginzburg 1991, 85-86) . It is therefore up to the historian to define his or her research subject in a suitable format when working on narrative historical inquiry.
There are four interrelated criteria a narrative text requires: (1) causal coherence, (2) a beginning and an ending, (3) a plot, and (4) a central subject. These traits are structural; they do not refer in any way to the content of narratives. If we are in search of general statements about the scientific validity of narratives or the use of causation, we need such a definition. Scientific validity cannot be decided on the basis of the subject being researched, but rather on the way it is researched, which is a structural notion. The same goes for causation. Whether the statement "A causes B" is true or false cannot be decided on the basis of what kind of things A and B are, but only on the basis of the relationship between the two, which is, again, a structural notion. None of the previously discussed theories of causation have made substantial statements about A and B, only general structural statements, such as "event," "object," "complex," "entity," and so on.
We must mention this, because much of the critique that is often given on the use of narratives in historiography is primarily aimed at specific substantial traits, which cannot be part of a general critique on the validity of the use of narratives. Braudel (quoted in White 1987, 32) , a leading exponent of the Annales School, claimed that narratives were always about particular individuals, most often kings or heroes, who were masters of their own fate and whose lives were dominated by dramatic coincidental events, whereas his own historiographical approach was concerned with the common man, whose life was dominated by all sorts of impersonal overarching structures. This critique is not justified, because even fictional narratives are certainly not necessarily concerned with free heroes who live by their own rules, and this is a fortiori true for historical narratives. It is certainly possible for a historical narrative to be about the common man and the impersonal structures that determine his life (e.g., Augustin Thierry's 1835 essay, subsequently discussed), or even not to be about individual people but about institutions, nations, practices, and the like. It might be true that, generally speaking, narratives tend to focus on individuals, but this is not necessarily the case and does not, in principle, argue against using narratives in historiography.
A second objection Braudel (White 1987 ) and many other historians hold against narratives is the claim that a historian who uses historical narratives as a mode of explanation gives a true and indubitable account of history-wie es eigentlich gewesen ("as it actually was"). This again is not a necessary consequence of the use of narratives. The combination of narratives and the "positivist" 10 historiography is a consequence of the coexistence of both concepts in Germany in the first half of the nineteenth century. The use of narratives was the dominant method of writing history during the period; historians still believed that a decisive, monotonic, and objectively true historiography was possible. However, the fact that most modern champions of the narratives, such as a leading exponent of hermeneutics, Paul Ricoeur (1984-88) , White (1987) , and Frank Ankersmit (2005) , are among the fiercest opponents of this ideal of objectivity shows that narratives and historiographical positivism are not necessarily connected.
An example of a typical historical narrative is the Staatsrecht-hypothesis, which was formulated by Wilhelm Arnold (1854) , who presented a theory about the origins and development of the typical medieval city as a continuous development from the early medieval domain. According to Arnold, urban development started off in the eighth century with a domain that was ruled by the bishop 11 and populated by two groups of people, one nonfree and one free. The nonfree were subject to the jurisdiction of the bishop, and the free only to that of the state. As time went by, both groups intermingled, and the difference between the two became quite vague. After a while, there was a conflict between church and state, and the bishop wanted to gain jurisdiction over the whole population. The population, which had become quite free by this time, refused to be subjected again, sided with the state (the emperor, the count, etc.), and rebelled. Out of this rebellion, the first urban communal institutions arose (Pirenne 1939, 5-7) . This is clearly a historical narrative. It has a central subject (the medieval city, or even the city, as such), a clear beginning (the domain of the early Middle Ages, which is seen as the earliest form of the medieval city-the germ from which it grew) and a clear ending (the typical medieval city of the High and Late Middle Ages). It also has a certain kind of plot: the medieval city undergoes a number of characteristic changes that are taken together in a certain way, in this case, a kind of progressive development toward the typical medieval city. Also, the different stages of development occurred in a chronological order and are not just alongside each other, but are clearly interrelated.
Causation and Historical Narrative
A historical narrative, Arnold's thesis cannot be summarized into a single causal statement of the form "A caused B." Arnold is not searching for the cause of the existence of the typical medieval city, but of its origins. This results from the way he defines and regards his research subject. Because he presupposes a gradual development of a single central subject of inquiry (the city in general) that remains present throughout the narrative, he cannot regard this subject as a cause or effect of something else, for it implies the existence of two different central subjects of inquiry (if one speaks of a cause, there is always an equally important effect, and vice versa). In the same way a seedling is not the cause of a tree or a caterpillar of a butterfly, the domain in the early Middle Ages is not the cause of the later medieval city: It is an earlier stage of the same thing.
Despite the fact that narratives offer no overall causal statements, causation and causal statements are still involved. Because the different statements of a historical narrative are causally related, the narrative in question is coherent.
12 First, causation plays a central role in one of the four criteria previously listed, namely, coherence. A series of descriptive statements is coherent because every statement is the effect of the one it immediately follows.
A narrative forms what can be described as a causal chain (Dray 1971, 162) . It is worth noting that the demands for such causal chains are usually more rigorous in historical narratives than in fictional ones. In fiction, it is no problem to jump through time twenty years or to suddenly end up on another continent. In historical narratives, however, such temporal and spatial jumps are usually not acceptable.
This notion of a narrative as a causal chain of events corresponds to the concept of a causal process. A causal process, such as the movement of a space station through space, is also constituted by (an infinite number 13 of) instances of specific causation, but does not result in any definite causal statements. In both types, every member of the chain is the effect of the member it immediately follows. It is because of this causal link that narratives are coherent.
Second, both causal processes and narratives need some kind of central subject or object that remains constant throughout the development of the process. This requires that Salmon's (1984 Salmon's ( , 1994 ) and Dowe's (2000) notion of causal process is interpreted in a less physical manner. Because Salmon and Dowe wanted to make sure that their theory is about physically real entities, they introduced extra criteria to identify these. In the case of historical narratives, the subject of research as defined by the historian (e.g., the medieval city) is basic. Thus, the notion of causal process becomes relative to the framework of the historian: the medieval city is a valid entity of inquiry because the historian defines it and treats it as such, not because it can be proven to be a physically real entity. This notion is even clearer with subjects that do not exist as individuals-the pope, for example. Only specific popes exist, whereas the pope is an institution. One should be cautious of interpreting the concept of "the pope" or "the papacy" physically. The fact that a narrative about the pope should stick to its subject does not mean that it should only include popes, and not Italian noblemen or the Holy Roman Emperor. The concept of the pope refers not only to the physical person who happens to be pope but also to a network of possible relations this person has with the Holy Roman Emperor, the Vatican, the French king, Italian cities, and so on. Moreover, this network of relations is precisely what it is that makes specific persons popes. If a history of the office of pope was only about the influence of one pope on his successor and so on, it would not really be a history of the papacy but just a series of narratives about some random people.
Third, causal processes also have something of a plot. The fact that we interpret the trajectory of a satellite around the earth as an orbit, more specifically an ellipse, has the same characteristics as a plot. It is a structure of the process as a whole, which endows every part of this process with meaning. Each specific point of its trajectory derives its meaning only in relation to the general structure of its movement, such as the satellite's orbit around the planet. The only difference between historical narratives and causal processes seems to be that causal processes do not seem to require a definite ending and a beginning. So narratives can be considered to form a specific subset of causal processes, provided the term causal process is used somewhat more analogously, as in the original accounts of Dowe (2000) and Salmon (1984 Salmon ( , 1994 .
There is a strict difference between narratives and historical statements, but this difference does not consist of simply the absence or presence of causation but rather of the way causation is used. A historical narrative is made coherent by causal statements; it cannot itself be seen as a causal claim. Answers to the historiographical question of why, however, can indeed be seen as causal claims.
Counterfactuals in Historiography: The Pirenne Thesis
In contrast to Arnold's (1854) Staatsrecht-hypothesis, the Pirenne thesis (2001) about the origin of medieval feudal Europe is clearly an answer to why. It was an attempt to explain the rise of medieval Europe and its transition from the classical era into the medieval. Pirenne believed that this transition did not take place in the fifth century, as was generally accepted, but at the end of the seventh century. He stated that the economic structure of the late Roman Empire continued to exist until the advance of the Arab world, which turned the Mediterranean Sea into a "lac Musulman" (a "Muslim lake"). He supposed that this event led to the formation of medieval Europe, and Pirenne's thesis can be summarized as a statement of the form "A caused B": namely, "The rise of (the specific nature of) medieval Europe as we know it was caused by the closing off of the Mediterranean Sea by the Arab world." Furthermore, Pirenne uses quite a lot of causal terminology in the formulation of his general thesis (Weinryb 1975, 36) .
But why does one need a causal thesis in the first place? Why could the transition from ancient to medieval society not be described by a historical narrative with Western society in general as its central subject, similar to Arnold's (1854) theory? The reason is that Pirenne wanted an explanation for the existence of something he regarded to be an essentially new phenomenon: the typical, essentially feudal, character of medieval Europe. Whereas, for Arnold, the typical medieval city was not essentially new, but the consequence of a continuous development that started from the classical domain, Pirenne believed that there was an essential difference between medieval and premedieval Europe.
The typical character of medieval Europe was at a certain point created. Because Pirenne's thesis is about this creation, medieval Europe is not present throughout his story. Because it is necessary for a narrative to have a central subject throughout, a causal statement, such as Pirenne's, cannot be described by a historical narrative as I previously described it. In summary, Pirenne cannot use a historical narrative because his thesis is a causal one. Pirenne wanted to answer why, which is always a causal statement of the form "A caused B."
Now we can take a look at what Pirenne meant by saying that "the rise of (the specific nature of) medieval Europe as we know it was caused by the closing off of the Mediterranean Sea by the Arab world." He does this by referring to counterfactual dependence. Pirenne summarized his thesis as follows, which gave its name to the title of his book Mohammed and Charlemagne.
Without Islam, the Frankish Empire would probably never have existed, and Charlemagne, without Mohammed, would be inconceivable. (Pirenne, quoted in Weinryb 1975, 36) So the rise of Islam caused the existence of the Frankish Empire: if Islam had not come about, the Frankish Empire would not have existed. This clearly implies the basic form of a counterfactual definition of causation, in which it is said that A caused B, and if A had not been the case, B would not have come to pass.
Nevertheless, there is more to the Pirenne (2001) thesis. He described a link between the rise of Islam and the existence of the feudal character of medieval Europe. The argument begins with the rise of Islam and ends with the rise of medieval Europe, and the argument itself consists of a series of mediating factors that link its beginning with its end. According to Pirenne, the Arabs closed the Mediterranean Sea to Christian commerce, which led to the disappearance of merchants as a social class. So the society became almost purely agrarian, which led to the typical feudal structure of the medieval society in which all power belonged to the landowners.
14 This corresponds to the previously discussed notion of a mediating mechanism. Pirenne argued for the existing link between two variables (the rise of Islam and the existence of medieval Europe as we know it) by positing additional variables that play a mediating role. There are two quantitative variables, the number of Western merchants (m) and the amount of long-distance trade (t), which is measured by the number of gold coins found on archeological sites, and two qualitative variables, the existence of Western feudal society (f) and the obstruction of access to the Mediterranean by Muslims (b), which can only take the values 1 or 0. Pirenne stated that there is a causal relationship between b and t, t and m, m and f, and, as a consequence, between b and f.
To summarize, the Pirenne thesis is a causal statement because it answers the question why with respect to the creation of something essentially new. Pirenne basically inter-preted this causal relation as counterfactual dependence, but he argued for it by means of a mediating mechanism-a first indication that some historians do indeed intuitively use different concepts of causation in their research.
Max Weber and the Comparative Method
One possible critique of Pirenne's (2001) If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in common save one, that one occurring only in the former; the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ, is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon." (Mill 1973, 391) To be able to apply this method, we need at least two cases. Because no two cases of the development of medieval Europe exist, Pirenne had to imagine what would have happened without the rise of Islam. This approach is quite common in historiography. When these "what if" histories are explicitly developed, they are called thought experiments. Robert Fogel (1964) has used this explicitly (contrary to Pirenne and many other historians, who do this implicitly). Fogel wanted to know whether the existence of railroads was the cause of American economic growth, which he investigated by opposing two situations: one real-American economic history as it really happened, with railroads-and one imaginative, which contains exactly the same initial circumstances, with the exception of railroads.
Of course, to depend on imaginative "what if" histories in historiography is quite speculative and involves high risks, which is the reason Pirenne had to back up his counterfactual statement with the help of a detailed mechanism (for a closer look at thought experiments in historiography, see De Mey and Weber 2003). Therefore, it is usually better to make comparisons with existing situations, which is what Max Weber (2002) did. Because Weber's historiographical problem was similar to Pirenne's, he also wanted to give an explanation for the existence of something new. In Pirenne's case, this was the feudal medieval society of Western Europe. In Weber's case, it was the existence of our own modernist, rationalist, and capitalist society. Because Weber suspected that the cause of the development of capitalism had something to do with religion, he compared Western society with other comparable societies with different religions or ethics, including the Roman Empire, Confucian, Daoist, and Buddhist China, and Hindu India. He concluded that it must have been the very specific work ethic of Protestantism that was the decisive factor, it being the only one absent from those non-Western cultures he had studied (and present in the Western cultures).
The method of difference, or the comparative method in general, is widespread in the social sciences, but its use in historiography is often problematic. Because a historian does not generate his or her own evidence (e.g., statistical sociological or psychological research) but rather is dependent on the sources, it is often much more difficult to find a large number of comparable cases. A related problem concerns the comparability of different historical situations. Partly owing to the small number of comparable cases and partly to the complicated nature of history and historiography, historical situations often have to be reformulated into very abstract models to make them comparable. Because of this high level of abstraction, the application of the historical method has often been seen more as historical sociology than as historiography. This necessarily entails a lack of accuracy and detail and, consequently, a lack of historical feeling for the uniqueness of a historical situation. Nevertheless, comparison is, as we have seen, often crucial in making the argument for causal relations.
Because there are problems with the comparative method in historical research, it often cannot be used on its own but has to be accompanied with back-up evidence in the form of social mechanisms. As did Pirenne, Weber (2002) offered a mechanism as an argument for his causal statement that modern society was caused by the Protestant ethic. In normal circumstances, the pursuit of ever-increasing financial profit, which Weber regarded as the essential feature of modern capitalism, is not possible, for individuals tend to try to minimize their efforts in seeking gain and avoid work whenever possible. As a consequence, people usually stop making profit when they think they've had enough, or they resort to the irrational pursuit of profit (e.g., the use of violence). Only the Protestant ethic, which sees work as a moral duty, views success in business as a benevolent religious sign (whereas violence, pleasure, leisure, and luxury are viewed as sins), allowing the continuous and rational pursuit of economic gain to become commonly accepted. The mechanism Weber posited can best be seen as a complexsystem mechanism, for he posited patterns of behavior in individuals to account for a property (namely, its rationalist and modernist character) of the society as a whole.
In the cases of both Pirenne and Weber, the basic causal claim is interpreted as counterfactual dependence, but this claim is supported by mechanisms; it seems that historians interpret the concept of causation as a plurivocal concept, involving at least two essentially different characterizations. A more systematic study of the historiographical literature would be required to verify this hypothesis.
Macrohistory, Narrative, and Causation
The macrohistory that originated in the 1950s and typified the second generation of the Annales, the journal Past and Present, the Anglo-Saxon New Economic History, and the German Gesellschaftsgeschichte is often seen as aimed against traditional narrative history and proclaiming a new kind of history writing, which was supposed to be strictly scientific and causal, instead of descriptive. Nevertheless, it will become clear that if we apply the concepts of narrative and causation to this kind of history, narratives still play an essential part.
The essence of the Braudelian perspective is the introduction of different levels of history. Braudel (1969) pretended to have unearthed new layers of history that did not show up in the traditional sources or using the traditional methods. He distinguished three levels. The first consists of the almost stationary interaction between man and his natural environment, the second of the slowly changing social and economic structures, and the third of the quickly changing political events. In the first volume of Civilization and Capitalism, he made a different distinction, claiming that there are three different levels of economic life (Braudel 1982). The best-known level is that of the traditional market economy. Underneath this level, however, there is a shadowy zone that often does not show up in the sources. Braudel called this material civilization and described it as an infraeconomy, the "world of self-sufficiency and barter of goods and services within a very small radius" (Braudel 2002, 24) . Above the market level, Braudel characterized another level, the complex social institutions and "anomalies" that have a decisive influence on the mechanisms of the market (ibid.).
The most important feature of Braudelian historiography (as becomes clear by the fact that Braudel used two very different distinctions of levels of history) is not the specific nature of these different levels but merely the idea itself that history consists of different levels, that there are always different histories, or better, different viewpoints on a single historical development. As we will see, it is in relation to this leveledness of history that the concept of causation comes in.
Braudel does not posit the question why in his work. The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II cannot be summarized into one statement in the form of "A caused B" (Megill 2007, 92-93) . In this sense, it is more similar to the narrative history of historians such as von Ranke (1840) and Arnold (1854) than to Pirenne (1939 ) or Weber (2002 . Does this mean, then, that Braudel himself actually still wrote the traditional narrative history against which he had reacted so strongly? The answer is no, because there is a distinctly new feature in the way Braudel writes history, namely, the use of different levels of history. Each of these levels is in itself described with the help of traditional narratives. In a Braudelian history of the bottom level, we have one specific topic, which could be called material life. We do not get any statements about its origin, or about certain general historical laws that are active in this domain. Instead, we just follow material life as it develops and changes gradually through time. This is as much a historical narrative as the history of the medieval city or the history of the pope. It has a central topic, material life. It also has a beginning and an end, simply the points where the historian chooses to start and end his or her story. The first volume of Braudel's (1982) Civilization and Capitalism starts more or less in 1300 and ends around 1800. Furthermore, there is a continuous coherence between the status of material life at a certain moment and that at a later or earlier moment. In fact, the aim (and the great merit) of a historical study in the spirit of Braudel is to provide, as much as the sources allow, an image of such a smooth and continuous development. This is accomplished by showing how different aspects of material life influence each other at different moments, without leaving too many gaps or unexplained developments or evolutions. The development of material life also contains, admittedly in a quite abstract way, a plot: it has peaks and valleys, descents and ascents. It can be cyclical, or it can evolve toward a height (like a traditional romance) or a low point (like a satire).
Despite the fact that a narrative at one specific level can be interesting in itself, it is still vital that these different levels are connected with each other. If not, there would be nothing really new about the Braudelian perspective. It would consist merely of a collection of three different, traditional narrative histories, without any reference to how they relate to one another. Without this connection, what is actually given are three different histories, instead of one history with three different aspects. Suppose we have a historical study on daily life during the Industrial Revolution in England consisting of three parts. The first describes the economic developments, the second the development of the social structure, and the third the evolution of culture. If these three narratives are not connected, if there is no reference to culture or social structure in the economic part or vice versa, there is not one England during the Industrial Revolution, but three different Englands and three different Industrial Revolutions that happen, in some mysterious and unexplained way, to have taken place in the same region during the same period. It is only by making clear that these three chapters are really three perspectives on the same historical situation that we can say we have a history of daily life during the Industrial Revolution. To be able to do this, we have to articulate an interaction between the different levels. This is the only way a new kind of total and multifaceted history is possible.
It is in this relation between different levels that the concept of causation plays its role. The aspects, structures, or historical factors present at one level are supposed to have a certain influence on certain aspects, structures, or historical factors at different levels. This influence is typically put in causal terms. If we say that culture reflects the socioeconomic structures, this signifies that the specific cultural situation at a certain time in history is caused by the socioeconomic circumstances, in some kind of counterfactual sense: if the socioeconomic situation had been different, that is, if a specific arrangement of socioeconomic circumstances had not occurred, the cultural situation would be different, that is, the correlating specific cultural arrangement of circumstances would not have occurred. This theory is compatible with most of the different counterfactual formulations of causation. If one wanted to manipulate the cultural situation, it could be done by manipulating the socioeconomic situation, whereas the converse is not the case. Also, if one has a number of comparable socioeconomic circumstances, there should also be a number of comparable cultural circumstances.
15
As Allan Megill (2007, 93) pointed out, Braudel never quite succeeded in making a causal link between the different levels of history. If we keep the previously discussed framework in mind, we can see why this is the case. We have seen, in the examples of Pirenne and Weber, that a counterfactual (and, by extension, also a manipulationist or interventionist) historical statement should be supported by a mechanism. If not, the causal claim expressed by the counterfactual is simply too speculative. The only way that one can avoid mechanisms is by appealing to general laws or models, but these kinds of (usually statistical) laws require extensive and rigorously performed experiments on different groups and control groups, or a large amount of data on comparable populations. Such experiments or data are only rarely available to the historian. Therefore, the Braudelian historian is forced to provide mechanisms.
In some cases, it is possible to provide mechanisms between economic, social, and cultural circumstances. For example, one can state that long periods of famine can change the inner structure of the society of a certain village, as a result of which the cultural codes for social behavior might also change. In the case of macrohistory, however, there is a problem because of the scale. It is one thing to describe a relationship between a famine and a social conflict but quite another thing to describe the relationship between the production of resources over a period of centuries and the worldview of the population of the entire Mediterranean area. A further problem is the direction of the causal influence. Thus far, I have assumed for the sake of the argument that there is a clear direction from the economic level to the social and cultural levels. As almost every contemporary historian knows, however, this assumption is too simple. On a small scale, this oversimplification is not always a problem. It is quite straightforward to say that a change in values of a certain population (the result of, for example, a conversion to another religion) causes a change in the way it produces its food. On a large scale, however, one would require a general understanding of what level influences other levels, in what specific ways, and under what circumstances.
The underlying reason for the fact that macrohistory has problems with providing mechanisms between different levels is different background conditions. We have already come across the concept of background conditions in the first part of this article. The general idea was that only those factors that are considered to be variable can be considered as causes and effects. On a small scale, there is quite a lot that is seen as forming a fixed context, such as the climate, the long-term modes of production, technology, gender differences, social hierarchies, and so on. The only things that are considered to be variable are sudden events like failed harvests. Therefore, because there are not that many things to explain, it is possible to provide a mechanism. On a macroscale, however, there are many more things (if the scale is large enough, all those previously mentioned) that become variable. Therefore, many things need (causal) explaining, and this entails a very complicated model that comprises the influences of such diverse factors as climate, failed harvests, gender differences, religious beliefs, quarrels between individual actors, and the like on each other. Articulating such a large-scale and all-encompassing model in history has, one can fairly say, proven to be impossible.
Combining different kinds of models is also not an option. This might solve the problem of the relationship between historical levels, but it would introduce a different and maybe even more problematic distinction between different histories, namely, the distinction between histories described by different models. Instead of an economic, social, and cultural Industrial Revolution, one would end up with a Marxist, Parsonian, or Foucauldian Industrial Revolution, which would entail, mutatis mutandis, the same problems previously described.
To summarize, it is simply not possible to formulate mechanisms at this scale. Nevertheless, as we have seen through the examples of Pirenne (1939) and Weber (2002) , historiographical causal statements are in need of mechanisms as back-up evidence for counterfactual causal claims, for these counterfactuals cannot be warranted by extensive and reliable experimental research on an array of comparable populations. Because of this, almost every historiographical causal statement needs to be supported by a mechanism. In the case of macrohistory, however, such mechanisms are too complex to be found. As a result, statements about causal relationships between events of different levels (as opposed to different events at the same level, which are situated in a narrative) will always be speculative, and the different levels of macrohistory will tend to develop into different histories instead of different aspects of the same history. Therefore, macrohistory in the Braudelian sense could not fulfill the task it set itself of presenting a total history. It is as a reaction to this flaw that microhistory originated.
Microhistory and Levels of Causation
The microhistory of Carlo Ginzburg (1991) , Giovanni Levi (1988 ), Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie (1978 , Natalie Davis (1983 ), Robert Darnton (1984 , and others is often thought to have nothing in common with macrohistory à la Braudel (1969 Braudel ( , 2002 . I believe that this notion is mistaken and that microhistory can be seen as a direct response to the problem of linking the historical levels. In a microhistorical situation, the levels are a priori linked, precisely because of the small scale. On this scale (through the use of common sense, one could say), the mechanisms between cultural, social, and economic levels do not require scientific justification to state that people in a certain village got mad, frustrated, or disappointed because of several years of failed harvests. It can almost, as a matter of speaking, be read directly from the sources. The merit of good microhistory is that it does more than just dwell on this small-scale description. It links the interaction among events on the small scale to structures and general tendencies on a larger scale. Darnton (1984) starts in The Great Cat Massacre with a typical small-scale phenomenon: the true tale, told by Nicholas Contat, of a riotous massacre in Paris in the late 1730s of a large number of cats, which was apparently seen as extremely funny by contemporaries. Because it is cruel in our contemporary eyes, not funny at all, Darnton wanted an explanation for the fact that it was thought to be so in the eighteenth century. He searched for an explanation by referring to more general economic and cultural structures. He first noticed that there was an economic imbalance between employers and employees. The workers were generally mistreated by their patrons, which led to workers' frustration toward their superiors. Then, Darnton found different symbolic structures, including sexually loaded jokes about cats, the identification of masters with their pets, and so on. In the massacre of cats, all of these contexts came together to form a humorous cocktail. In his book, Darnton linked the different levels of history (cultural, economical, social, etc.) by stating that they have a common causal influence on one specific small-scale event, in which the different levels appear as intuitively and a priori interrelated. It is interesting that this influence is causal and that it occurs between different levels of history: long-term, short-term, cultural, social, and economic. In this sense, microhistory is a continuation of Braudelian macrohistory.
In essence, microhistory gives up one part of the scope of macrohistory to preserve another part, the linkage between the different levels of history. In one way, microhistory is a total history because it describes all aspects of human life (social, economical, and cultural) using one particular event, and it uses the concept of causation to do this. The disadvantage is that this can only happen from a narrow point of view, namely, by starting from one specific shortlived historical event. Microhistory abandons the ideal of a decisive and total history with a large scope in time and space, written from an overarching point of view.
The methodology of a historiography that aims at the explanation of single small-scale events 16 through different causal influences from different levels has been formalized by Lawrence Stone (1979) and Peter Gay (1976) . They both introduce three levels of historical causation. Gay calls these long range causes, short range causes, and releasers. Stone makes a distinction between preconditions, which make the event possible; precipants, which make it probable; and triggers, which are supposed to make the event necessary (Lorenz 2002, 146-47) . If we interpret this in terms of concepts of causation we get a mix of concepts. Preconditions are defined in terms of counterfactuals. Without the preconditions, the event would have been impossible. The precipants are defined in terms of (often nonquantifiable) probabilities. They are supposed to make the event a lot more likely, to seriously raise the chance that it happens. Triggers are defined in terms of constant conjunction of an effect with respect to its cause or, more specifically, sufficient conditions. A is a trigger if, given the circumstances, every time A occurs, it is absolutely necessary that B also occurs.
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It has become clear that Braudel still uses historical narratives, despite his critique of their use. The innovative aspect of Braudelian historiography is the introduction of different levels of history, which place different narratives alongside each other. Thus, it is necessary to connect these different levels by positing causal relations between them. On the macroscale, however, this seems very difficult or even impossible. Microhistory can be seen as a solution to this problem. In a small-scale event, the different levels of history are linked in an a priori, intuitive way. Their relationship to processes on a larger scale is made clear by a three-layer scheme that consists of three kinds of causal relations. The disadvantage of microhistory is that these large-scale processes are seen only from the point of view of a small-scale event, which implies that part of the universality of the Braudelian perspective is sacrificed.
Summary
This article aims to show that historians and philosophers of history should not take the concept of causation for granted. An array of theories on causation in philosophy exist, most of which are also used in historiography. We have seen that, varying with the research problems and the definition of the subject of historiographical inquiry, different concepts of causation are used. Furthermore, these different concepts are often combined. Mechanisms can be used to support causal claims interpreted as counterfactuals, and different concepts of causation can be used to connect different levels of history in microhistory. In addition, it has also become clear that, although there is a strict distinction between historical narratives and causal statements, causation is not necessarily absent from narratives altogether. Also, because an analogy can be drawn between causal processes (which are mainly based on physics and the exact sciences) and historical narratives, the difference between narrative historiography and practices in other sciences, although still important, is not as radical as is often thought.
Finally, I also suggest that the macrohistory in the Braudelian fashion is still essentially narrative, whereas microhistory is essentially causal. Seen in this way, microhistory is a reaction to the methodological problems present in macrohistory.
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1. In the first quote, but not in the first part of the second, Hume also mentioned contiguity as a condition for causation. For reasons of clarity, I will leave this matter aside, because contiguity is, in my opinion, not a real issue in historical causation, contrary to physics, for example.
2. Mill's theory has been elaborated by John Mackie (1974) . According to Mackie, A is a cause of B in the ordinary sense of the word if and only if A and B both occur, A is temporally prior to B, and A is a so-called INUS condition of B. (INUS condition means an Insufficient but Nonredundant part of a Condition, which is itself Unnecessary but exclusively Sufficient for B in the circumstances). The specific complex condition that is said to have caused a forest fire does not need to be a necessary one. It is possible that the forest might have caught fire without a lightning flash (e.g., if someone had dropped a match). The different INUS conditions of the forest fire can be seen as possible causes in the ordinary sense of the word, as opposed to the full cause, which is a disjunction of complex conditions (both positive and negative). Mackie considers this full cause to be the only genuine cause, as does Mill. INUS conditions can be said to be causes only in a practical sense in common speech, not in philosophy or science. (For a more detailed summary of Mackie's theory and some specific applications, see Leon Horsten and Erik Weber 2005.) 3. Partly because of the problem of the selection of causes, in which such a completely neutral and objective point of view often seems impossible, it has been recently suggested that causation should be considered a "perspectivalist" concept (see Menzies 2007; Price 2007) . In brief, causation is a concept that we, as human agents, use to make sense of an underlying world describable by non-(or less-) perspective-dependent notions, such as counterfactual dependence or, alternatively, laws of nature. Although causal perspectivalism as a philosophical position has nothing to do with the selection of causes, it is quite clear that the notion of causation as a perspective-dependent concept is prompted by the problems arising from the selection of causes.
4. It should be noted that, strictly speaking, James Woodward does not refer to manipulations but rather a technical notion of an "intervention," which is believed to be definable without reference to possible or thinkable manipulations by us as human agents. Because we are not concerned with metaphysics here, and because Woodward's account clearly starts from manipulations as a root metaphor or basic intuition of what is the essence of causation, however, I believe it is better to start from manipulations and interventions considered basic, which does not make a difference with regard to historiographical applications. For a more detailed picture of his theory of causation, see Woodward (2003) .
5. Note, however, that in Salmon's theory, the notion of "process" is not defined in terms of objects but is taken as a primitive term (see Hitchcock 1995, 306) . In Dowe's (2000, 90) theory, however, processes are indeed defined in terms of objects. Again, because we are not concerned with the metaphysics of causation at this point and because I believe that the concept of a causal processes is intuitively easier to understand in terms of objects, I will use it in this way. For a deeper understanding, the reader is referred to the discussions in the fourth and fifth chapters of Dowe's book.
6. Salmon (1984) made a distinction between causal processes (such as a billiard ball running on a flat surface) and pseudoprocesses (such as a spot of light that moves across a wall) by introducing the idea of mark transmittance. Intuitively, this criterion is introduced to ensure that the object involved in the process is a "real" object. A process can only be a causal process when it could be (or could have been) capable of transmitting a so-called mark, a certain (minor) change in the properties of the object that form the basis of this causal process. If this cannot or could not be done, the object in question cannot be the basis of a causal process. In a pseudoprocess such as the movement of a spot of light on a wall, making such a mark is impossible. A typical example of marking is making a cut in a baseball before throwing it. Salmon (ibid., 148) defined the idea in the following way:
Let p be a process that, in the absence of interactions with other processes, would remain uniform with respect to characteristic Q, which it would manifest consistently over an interval that includes both of the space-time points A and B (A ≠ B) . Then a mark (consisting of a modification of Q into Q'), which has been introduced into process p by means of a single local interaction at point A, is transmitted to point B if p manifests the modification Q' at B and at all stages of the process between A and B without additional interventions.
7. Salmon (1984, 171 ) defined a causal interaction in the following way:
Let P1 and P2 be two processes that intersect with one another at the space-time point S, which belongs to the histories of both. Let Q be a characteristic that process P1 would exhibit throughout an interval (which includes subintervals on both sides of S in the history of P1) if the intersection with P2 did not occur; let R be a characteristic that process P2 would exhibit throughout an interval (which includes subintervals on both sides of S in the history of P2) if the intersection with P1 did not occur. Then, the intersection of P1 and P2 at S constitutes a causal interaction if: (1) P1 exhibits the characteristic Q before S, but it exhibits a modified characteristic Q' throughout an interval immediately following S; and (2) P2 exhibits R before S but it exhibits a modified characteristic R' throughout an interval immediately following S.
Phil Dowe (2000) has taken over the idea of a causal process and a causal interaction from Salmon, but he has also suggested some changes. The most important of these changes is the replacement of the mark transmittance criterion by a different criterion: that of a conserved quantity. A process is a causal process, according to Dowe, when the object involved possesses a certain kind of conserved quantity, most typically a physical quantity such as momentum or energy. Dowe defined a causal interaction not as an intersection that involves a change in properties, but one that involves an exchange of a conserved quantity. Salmon (1994) largely agreed with Dowe, thus abandoning his original position.
8. Note that those authors to whom I refer do not use these terms themselves; they merely talk about "mechanisms" as such.
9. The description of mechanisms as complex-system mechanisms and mediating mechanisms is largely similar to that of Peter Hedström and Richard Swedberg (1998) , but there is an important nuance. According to Hedström and Swedberg, a mechanism should always be, at least in a limited sense, general. A simple description of a chain of events that leads from one event to another will not do. This is not the case, at least not in principle, in most parts of the philosophical literature. I will subsequently use the concept of mechanisms as it is defined in the philosophical literature, regarding simple descriptions of chains of events as examples of mechanisms.
10. Here, one should watch for a confusing use of the term positivism. In philosophy, positivism refers to the logical positivism of the Wiener Kreis (Vienna Circle), which has very little to do with the positivism often ascribed to von Ranke (1840) . In this article, positivism refers to the Rankean ideal of writing history as it "really was," not that of the Kreis.
11. Arnold treats only the episcopal cities, because they are thought to provide the clearest picture of urban development.
12. It might be that there are still ways other than causation to create coherence. I have omitted them from this article, however.
13. Narratives might not literally consist of an infinite number of such causal statements, but in every narrative there are enough explicit and implicit causal statements to treat them as analog to causal processes.
14. The most comprehensive account of Pirenne's (2001) thesis can be found in Mahomet et Charlemagne, translated into English as Mohammed and Charlemagne. My two-line description is, again, a very shallow summary of the argumentation structure of this book.
15. Note that this does not imply that there is a perfectly direct relationship between socioeconomic and cultural situations. It might just as well be a one-to-many relationship (true of most Marxist or Marxist-inspired theories).
16. Although this model is most characteristic for microhistory, it is also used for events on a larger scale, such as the English Revolution or World Wars I and II.
17. For an elaboration of the difference between triggers and causes, see Fred Dretske (2004) .
